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PAY CONFIDENTIALITY: A REMAINING OBSTACLE TO 
EQUAL PAY AFTER LEDBETTER 
Brian P. O’Neill ∗ 
I. INTRODUCTION 
In April 2007, Justice Alito delivered the majority opinion in 
Ledbetter v. Goodyear Tire and Rubber Company
1
—the most controversial 
labor-and-employment case of the 2006–2007 term for the Supreme 
Court of the United States.
2
  Ledbetter called on the Court to decide 
whether a plaintiff may proceed with a pay-discrimination claim un-
der Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 (Title VII) when an em-
ployer’s decision to discriminate occurred outside of the Equal Em-
ployment Opportunity Commission (EEOC) charging period, but the 
employer issued paychecks reflecting the unlawful discrimination 
within the EEOC charging period.
3
  The Court, in a five-to-four opi-
nion, held that individual paychecks do not qualify as discrete acts of 
discrimination and that an employee, for his or her filing to be time-
ly, must file a complaint within 180 or 300 days, depending on 
whether the employee filed with a state or local agency,
4
 of the em-
ployer’s discriminatory pay decisions.
5
  Ledbetter garnered widespread 
criticism from academics,
6
 politicians,
7
 and civic organizations.
8
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 1 550 U.S. 618 (2007), superseded by statute, Lilly Ledbetter Fair Pay Act of 2009, 
Pub. L. No. 111-2, 123 Stat. 5. 
 2 Michael Selmi, The Supreme Court’s 2006−2007 Term Employment Law Cases: A 
Quiet But Revealing Term, 11 EMP. RTS. & EMP. POL’Y J. 219, 219–20 (2007). 
 3 Ledbetter, 550 U.S. at 623. 
 4 An aggrieved person must file a claim within 180 days of the alleged unlawful 
action.  42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5 (2006).  But if she has filed a claim with a state or local 
agency, the aggrieved person must file the claim within the earlier of either 300 days 
of the unlawful conduct or 30 days after the state or local agency terminated pro-
ceedings.  Id. 
 5 See Ledbetter, 550 U.S. at 628. 
 6 See, e.g., Martha C. Nussbaum, The Supreme Court: 2006 Term: Constitutions and 
Capabilities: “Perception” Against Lofty Formalism, 121 HARV. L. REV. 4, 81 (2007) (“What 
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These critics argued that the decision would foreclose many victims 
of pay discrimination from the opportunity to file a timely claim.
9
 
Members of the 110th Congress promptly countered the Court’s 
decision with legislation designed to overturn Ledbetter, but oppo-
nents of the bill successfully forestalled the measure in the Senate.
10
  
After the 2008 election, however, Congress and President Barack Ob-
ama answered Ledbetter’s critics’ ongoing concerns with the Lilly Led-
better Fair Pay Act of 2009 (LLFPA).
11
  The LLFPA amended the op-
eration of several central pieces of employment legislation,
12
 
including Title VII.
13
  Section 3 amended Title VII so that an employ-
er commits an unlawful employment practice each time it issues a 
paycheck reflecting a discriminatory compensation decision.
14
  Em-
ployees such as Lilly Ledbetter may now proceed with Title VII claims 
if they receive disparate pay within the EEOC charging period even 
though the employer made the discriminatory pay decision outside of 
the statute of limitations.
15
  In a nod to employer interests, Congress 
put a two-year limit on back pay for successful plaintiffs.
16
 
The LLFPA is clearly a major victory for employees; nonetheless, 
it is incapable of according sufficient relief to a particular class of 
plaintiffs.  This does not mean, however, that Congress failed to draft 
legislation that adequately responds to Ledbetter.  The deficiencies 
stem from two necessary elements of Title VII⎯its 180/300-day sta-
tute of limitations and its two-year limit on back pay.  The LLFPA 
does not change the statute-of-limitations period, and thus, Title VII 
 
the majority’s reasoning really entailed was that women will often be unable to sue 
for pay discrimination.”). 
 7 See, e.g., 154 CONG. REC. H7638 (daily ed. July 31, 2008) (statement of Rep. 
Slaughter) (characterizing the decision as a “grave mistake”). 
 8 See, e.g., Liz Gilchrist, Supreme Court Moves Backward on Equal Pay, NAT’L ORG. 
FOR WOMEN, May 30, 2007, http://www.now.org/issues/economic/ 
070530equalpay.html. 
 9 See supra notes 6–8. 
 10 Carl Hulse, Republican Senators Block Pay Discrimination Measure, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 
24, 2008, at A22. 
 11 Lilly Ledbetter Fair Pay Act of 2009, Pub. L. No. 111-2, 123 Stat. 5. 
 12 Id. pmbl., 123 Stat. at 5 (amending “[T]itle VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 
and the Age Discrimination in Employment Act of 1964, and . . . modify[ing] the op-
eration of the Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990 and the Rehabilitation Act of 
1973”). 
 13 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e–2000e-17 (2006). 
 14 § 3, 123 Stat. at 5–6. 
 15 See infra Part II.B. 
 16 See id. 
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continues to offer relief only to employees that discover a compensa-
tion disparity within 180 days after their final paycheck.
17
  Additional-
ly, employees are eligible to recover only two years of back pay even if 
a discriminatory pay decision has affected an employee’s compensa-
tion for the past twenty years.
18
  These Title VII provisions are crucial 
for the prompt processing of claims; however, without additional leg-
islation, these limitations may unjustly bar a particular class of plain-
tiffs⎯employees working for employers with pay secrecy-and-
confidentiality (PSC) rules—from receiving due compensation. 
PSC rules are workplace rules that forbid employees from dis-
cussing wages with each other.
19
  They represent a subset of a larger 
set of rules designed to set limitations on employee speech.
20
  While 
many employers formalize these rules in employment policies, other 
employers communicate their expectations of pay secrecy informal-
ly.
21
  A typical PSC rule implicitly or explicitly threatens violators with 
disciplinary action, or even conditions employment on compliance.
22
 
Justice Ginsburg, in her powerful Ledbetter dissent, expressed 
concern for employees in workplaces governed by PSC rules.
23
  The 
dissenting Justice correctly noted that PSC rules make it difficult for 
employees to determine whether their employers are discriminating 
against them.
24
  Without the right to discuss wages, workers cannot be 
certain that their employer is paying them equitably.  Workers’ lack 
of wage information is a key obstacle to their discovering and correct-
ing pay disparities.  PSC rules enable unscrupulous employers to dis-
criminate against classes of employees while simultaneously prevent-
ing those employees from uncovering the discrimination. 
Although some experts have concluded that PSC rules are preva-
lent in American workplaces, section 8 of the National Labor Rela-
tions Act (NLRA or Act) prohibits such rules.
25
  Courts consistently 
have held that PSC rules constitute unfair labor practices, which vi-
 
 17 See § 2000e-5(e)(1). 
 18 See § 3, 123 Stat. at 6. 
 19 See infra notes 103–112 and accompanying text. 
 20 See id. 
 21 See id. 
 22 See id. 
 23 Ledbetter v. Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co., 550 U.S. 618, 649−50 & n.3 (2007) 
(Ginsburg, J., dissenting), superseded by statute, Lilly Ledbetter Fair Pay Act of 2009, 
Pub. L. No. 111-2, 123 Stat. 5. 
 24 Id. 
 25 See infra Part IV.A. 
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olate employees’ rights under section 7 of the NLRA to engage in 
concerted activity.
26
  Additionally, several states have enacted legisla-
tion prohibiting PSC rules and encouraging wage transparency.
27
 
Unfortunately, existing federal and state laws concerning PSC 
rules are unable to prevent the promulgation of potentially harmful 
policies because the laws are fundamentally flawed in their design 
and operation.
28
  Congress can remedy these laws’ shortcomings by 
passing statutory reform that removes jurisdiction over PSC rules 
from the province of the National Labor Relations Board (NLRB or 
Board) and effectively preventing the promulgation of PSC rules in 
American workplaces. 
Part II of this Comment discusses the recent enactment of the 
LLFPA.  That section summarizes the Court’s decision in Ledbetter, re-
views Congress’s response, and analyzes the LLFPA’s inherent inabili-
ty to fully protect employees in workplaces that maintain PSC rules.  
Part III of this Comment provides an overview of PSC rules.  That sec-
tion discusses the prevalence of PSC rules in American workplaces, 
explains why and how employers promulgate and enforce PSC rules, 
and summarizes the purported benefits to employers that utilize PSC 
rules.  Part IV details the statutory landscape currently governing PSC 
rules—the NLRA and four state statutes.  Part V explains why the cur-
rent statutory regime governing PSC rules is inadequate.  Part VI out-
lines potential legislative solutions to the continuing promulgation of 
PSC rules.  That section presents recommendations on how federal 
legislators can effectively address the largest problems undermining 
legislation currently regulating PSC rules⎯its failure to protect su-
pervisors or provide adequate incentive for compliance.  Congress 
should pass legislation that exempts PSC rules from NLRA regula-
tion, levies civil fines on violators, allows plaintiffs to sue for punitive 
damages, and extends the right to wage discussion to supervisory em-
ployees.  A model for future congressional legislation that is capable 
of effectively eliminating PSC rules from American workplaces closes 
that section.  Finally, Part VII concludes this Comment by emphasiz-
ing the need for legislation that eliminates PSC rules to accomplish 
the LLFPA’s goal of ending compensation discrimination. 
 
 26 See id. 
 27 See infra Part IV.B. 
 28 See infra Part V. 
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II. THE LILLY LEDBETTER FAIR PAY ACT 
Pay discrimination going unnoticed by victimized employees is a 
serious danger inherent in PSC rules because employers conceal the 
discrimination by silencing wage discussion.  A lack of wage transpa-
rency among coworkers creates difficulty for employees to determine 
the existence of wage discrepancies or discrimination.  In May 2007, 
the Supreme Court compounded the danger of PSC rules in Ledbetter 
v. Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co.
29
  The majority held that a paycheck re-
flecting prior discriminatory decisions does not restart the EEOC 
charging period, which forecloses the opportunity to bring a Title VII 
claim for many victims of pay discrimination.
30
  This decision was par-
ticularly ominous for employees whose employers promulgated PSC 
rules.  Even if such employees were fortunate enough to realize that 
their employer was paying them unfairly, they likely could not make 
this discovery within the stringent 180-day filing period. 
Less than two years later, the 111th Congress, with the support 
of President Obama, made an important first step toward reversing 
the potential inequities resulting from Ledbetter and PSC rules by pass-
ing the LLFPA into law.  The LLFPA essentially reversed Ledbetter’s 
holding that a paycheck reflective of prior compensation discrimina-
tion cannot serve as a “discrete act” for the purpose of restarting the 
EEOC charging period.
31
  The LLFPA was a crucial step in achieving 
equal pay for equal work.  Nonetheless, it does not fully alleviate 
problems flowing from the existence of PSC rules.  Employees who 
are unable to discern whether they are receiving disparate pay be-
cause of PSC rules will still encounter two specific problems.  First, 
the LLFPA does not offer back pay for discrimination occurring more 
than two years prior to the charge.  Second, the current law leaves 
without recourse plaintiffs who do not discover discrimination until 
180/300 days after their final paycheck. 
A. Ledbetter v. Goodyear Tire & Rubber Company 
In 1979, Goodyear hired Lilly Ledbetter as a production supervi-
sor in its Gadsden, Alabama plant.
32
  Six years later, management 
 
 29 550 U.S. 618 (2007), superseded by statute, Lilly Ledbetter Fair Pay Act of 2009, 
Pub. L. No. 111-2, 123 Stat. 5. 
 30 See id. at 625. 
 31 Lilly Ledbetter Fair Pay Act of 2009, Pub. L. No. 111-2, §§ 2−3, 123 Stat. 5, 5–6. 
 32 Ledbetter v. Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co., 421 F.3d 1169, 1173 (11th Cir. 
2005), aff’d, 550 U.S. 618 (2007), superseded by statute, Lilly Ledbetter Fair Pay Act of 
2009, Pub. L. No. 111-2, 123 Stat. 5. 
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promoted her to the newly created position of Area Manager after 
she scored the second highest among more than forty-five applicants 
for the position.
33
  In January 1998, management transferred Ledbet-
ter to the position of Technology Engineer, and in November of that 
year, she took an early retirement.
34
 
Pay records and testimony demonstrated that in 1997, Goodyear 
paid Ledbetter much less than male employees in the same position.
35
  
The pay discrepancies between Ledbetter and men in the same posi-
tion ranged from 15–40 percent.
36
  Her pay was so low that it fell be-
low the minimum salary set by Goodyear’s policy for her position.
37
  
Long after the first pay decision that she challenged, Ledbetter filed a 
charge of discrimination with the EEOC.
38
  After receiving her right-
to-sue letter from the EEOC, Ledbetter filed suit in the Northern Dis-
trict of Alabama and alleged pay discrimination under Title VII.
39
 
Ledbetter claimed that her disparate pay was the consequence of 
discrimination.
40
  Three pieces of evidence supported this allegation.  
First, she demonstrated that her performance rankings were not ac-
curate reflections of her performance.
41
  Early in her career at Goo-
dyear, Ledbetter’s direct supervisor threatened to give her additional 
evaluations if she did not succumb to his sexual advances.
42
  Although 
management moved Ledbetter to a different supervisor, Goodyear 
later reassigned her former harasser to the role of her Performance 
Auditor.
43
  Once again, he made advances that she rejected, which re-
sulted in more poor evaluations.
44
  Ledbetter also revealed that in 
1996, another of her supervisors gave her a poor performance evalua-
 
 33 Brief for Petitioner-Appellant at 3, Ledbetter v. Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co., 
550 U.S. 618 (2007) (No. 05-1074), superseded by statute, Lilly Ledbetter Fair Pay Act of 
2009, Pub. L. No. 111-2, 123 Stat. 5. 
 34 Ledbetter, 421 F.3d at 1174−75. 
 35 Id. at 1174. 
 36 Id. 
 37 Brief for Petitioner-Appellant, supra note 33, at 3. 
 38 See Ledbetter, 421 F.3d at 1175. 
 39 Id.  Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 provides that it is an “unlawful em-
ployment practice” to discriminate “against any individual with respect to his com-
pensation . . . because of such individual’s . . . sex.”  42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a)(1) 
(2006). 
 40 Ledbetter, 421 F.3d at 1175, 1180. 
 41 Brief for Petitioner-Appellant, supra note 33, at 5. 
 42 Id. 
 43 Id. at 5–6. 
 44 Id. at 6. 
ONEILL (FINAL) (DO NOT DELETE) 6/21/2010  6:15 PM 
2010] COMMENT 1223 
 
tion while also recommending her for the company’s “Top Perfor-
mance Award.”
45
  Second, Ledbetter presented testimony of other 
female Goodyear employees who stated that Goodyear discriminated 
against them.
46
  Third, Ledbetter testified that other plant officials 
made biased remarks during her time at Goodyear.
47
 
Goodyear argued that the pay discrepancy arose naturally from 
its “neutral merit system.”
48
  Under this system, the Business Center 
Manager (Manager) would make recommendations about who 
should receive raises and how much their raises should be.
49
  The 
Manager based the recommendations on performance, subjective 
impressions, and Performance Auditors’ reports.
50
  Goodyear consis-
tently gave Ledbetter smaller raises than those that were to her male 
counterparts or no raises at all.
51
  The company contended that the 
discrepancies were simply a result of her poor performance.
52
 
The jury found in favor of Ledbetter and awarded her back pay 
and damages.
53
  On appeal, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ele-
venth Circuit reversed and found that Ledbetter failed to file a timely 
charge within the statutory charging period for a Title VII claim.
54
  
The statute requires plaintiffs to file a charge with the EEOC within 
180/300 days of the unlawful employment practice.
55
  The Court of 
Appeals concluded that Ledbetter’s claims based on the 1980s and 
mid-1990s pay decisions were untimely and that no reasonable juror 
 
 45 Id. at 5. 
 46 Id. at 7. 
 47 Brief for Petitioner-Appellant, supra note 33, at 8. 
 48 Id. at 5.  See also Ledbetter v. Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co., 421 F.3d 1169, 
1172−73 (11th Cir. 2005) (describing the “merit compensation system”), aff’d, 550 
U.S. 618 (2007), superseded by statute, Lilly Ledbetter Fair Pay Act of 2009, Pub. L. No. 
111-2, 123 Stat. 5.  
 49 Ledbetter, 421 F.3d at 1172. 
 50 Id. (stating that the recommendations were based “primarily” on performance 
but that the details of the system were not worth extended discussion); Brief for Peti-
tioner-Appellant, supra note 33, at 5. 
 51 Ledbetter, 421 F.3d at 1174−75. 
 52 Brief for Petitioner-Appellant, supra note 33, at 5.  See also Ledbetter, 421 F.3d at 
1173−75 (discussing Goodyear management’s appraisals of Ledbetter’s perfor-
mance). 
 53 Ledbetter v. Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co., No. 99-C-3137-E, 2003 U.S. Dist. 
LEXIS 27406, at *1−5 (N.D. Ala. Sept. 24, 2003), rev’d, 421 F.3d 1169 (11th Cir. 
2005), aff’d, 550 U.S. 618 (2007), superseded by statute, Lilly Ledbetter Fair Pay Act of 
2009, Pub. L. No. 111-2, 123 Stat. 5. 
 54 Ledbetter, 421 F.3d at 1171. 
 55 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(e)(1) (2006); see supra note 4 and accompanying text. 
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could find that Goodyear acted with discriminatory intent while mak-
ing the only two pay decisions occurring within the 180-day period 
prior to Ledbetter’s charge⎯decisions made in 1997 and 1998—to 
deny her a raise.
56
  Ledbetter’s petition for a writ of certiorari did not 
contest the Eleventh Circuit’s findings regarding these final two pay 
decisions.  Instead, she framed the issue as 
[w]hether and under what circumstances a plaintiff may bring an 
action under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 alleging il-
legal pay discrimination when the disparate pay is received during 
the statutory limitations period, but is the result of intentionally 
discriminatory pay decisions that occurred outside the limitations 
period.
57
 
Justice Alito, writing for a five-to-four majority, denied Ledbet-
ter’s Title VII claim and held that the applicable limitations period of 
180 days had run before she filed her EEOC questionnaire.
58
  The 
Court found that the charging period for the decisions made with 
discriminatory intent—the early 1980s and mid-1990s retaliatory 
evaluations—had long since expired.
59
  The majority explained that 
paychecks reflecting earlier pay decisions based on these negative 
evaluations were merely effects of past discrimination and did not 
constitute discrete instances of discrimination because, viewed alone, 
they lacked the requisite discriminatory intent.
60
  In sum, the Court 
held that the EEOC charging period begins running with an act of 
 
 56 Ledbetter, 421 F.3d at 1178. 
 57 Ledbetter v. Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co., 550 U.S. 618, 623 (2007), superseded 
by statute, Lilly Ledbetter Fair Pay Act of 2009, Pub. L. No. 111-2, 123 Stat. 5. 
 58 See id. at 621–43.  An EEOC intake questionnaire solicits preliminary informa-
tion from the aggrieved party.  Laurie M. Stegman, An Administrative Battle of the 
Forms: The EEOC’s Intake Questionnaire and Charge of Discrimination, 91 MICH. L. REV. 
124, 125 (1992).  Ledbetter did not include a discriminatory-pay claim until she filed 
a formal charge in July 1998.  Ledbetter, 550 U.S. at 622 n.1.  The parties, however, as-
sumed that the EEOC charging period began running on September 26, 1997⎯the 
date that she filed her intake questionnaire.  Id. at 622 & n.1.  The court likewise as-
sumed that the filing of the questionnaire initiated the EEOC charging period.  Id. at 
622 n.1.  In February 2008, the Supreme Court held that “a filing is deemed a charge 
if the document reasonably can be construed to request agency action and appropri-
ate relief on the employee’s behalf.”  Fed. Express Corp. v. Holowecki, 533 U.S. 389, 
404 (2008).  The Court concluded that EEOC intake questionnaires satisfy this test 
and thus constitute formal charges for the purpose of determining whether a plain-
tiff has satisfied the statutory filing requirements.  Id. 
 59 Ledbetter, 550 U.S. at 628. 
 60 Id. at 629. 
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discrimination and is not renewed each time that a victim suffers an 
effect of the prior discrimination.
61
 
The majority based its stringent adherence to the filing deadline 
on a policy argument that “[s]tatutes of limitations serve a policy of 
repose.”
62
  The 180-day policy, Justice Alito contended, works to bal-
ance aggrieved employees’ interests with employers’ interest in swift 
processing of employment-discrimination charges.
63
  The Court ex-
plained that the short filing deadline reflects Congress’s intent to en-
courage prompt processing of Title VII allegations.
64
  Without rela-
tively short deadlines, employers would need to defend charges 
arising from employment decisions that occurred long ago.
65
  This 
consideration was particularly relevant to Lilly Ledbetter.  Her dis-
crimination claim rested on the misconduct of a Goodyear employee 
who retaliated against her for rejecting his sexual advances in the ear-
ly 1980s and mid-1990s.
66
  Ledbetter argued that this employee’s mis-
conduct was the foundation for negative performance evaluations 
that caused her to receive disparate pay.
67
  At the time of trial, this su-
pervisor had died and thus could not testify.
68
  A timely charge would 
have avoided this evidentiary problem. 
The majority cited the Court’s precedent supporting its argu-
ment that continuing adverse consequences of past discrimination do 
not restart the EEOC charging period.
69
  The Court also addressed 
 
 61 Id. at 628 (“A new violation does not occur, and a new charging period does 
not commence, upon the occurrence of subsequent nondiscriminatory acts that en-
tail adverse effects resulting from the past discrimination.”). 
 62 Id. at 630. 
 63 Id. at 642. 
 64 Id. at 630. 
 65 Ledbetter, 550 U.S. at 630. 
 66 Id. at 632 n.4. 
 67 Id. 
 68 Id. 
 69 Id. at 625–30.  The Court relied primarily on two Supreme Court cases.  Id. at 
625−26.  In United Air Lines, Inc. v. Evans, 431 U.S. 553 (1977), the defendant’s policy 
that refused to employ married flight attendants forced the plaintiff to resign.  Id. at 
554.  Years later, the employer rehired the plaintiff but regarded her as a new em-
ployee.  Id. at 555.  Her status as a new employee had a negative impact on her se-
niority status.  Id.  The plaintiff sued on the grounds that the present effect of the 
company’s illegal act, that is, forcing her to resign based on marital status, renewed 
the statutory filing period.  Id. at 557.  The Court denied her claim and concluded 
that the continuing effects of the past discrimination did not constitute a new claim.  
Id. at 558.  In Delaware State Coll. v. Ricks, 449 U.S. 250 (1980), the employer denied 
the plaintiff tenure but granted him a final, nonrenewable one-year contract.  Id. at 
252–53.  The employee sued, alleged that the school discharged him based on na-
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Bazemore v. Friday,
70
 which appeared on the surface to support the no-
tion that pay discrimination was a continuing violation: “Each week’s 
paycheck that delivers less to a black than to a similarly situated white 
is a wrong actionable under Title VII, regardless of the fact that this 
pattern was begun prior to the effective date of Title VII.”
71
  This lan-
guage, Ledbetter and the dissent argued, meant that the 180-day pe-
riod ran anew from each paycheck that reflected the prior discrimi-
natory decision.
72
  Justice Alito, however, distinguished Bazemore by 
explaining that the decision stands for the proposition that paychecks 
trigger new EEOC charging periods only when the pay structure is 
discriminatory on its face.
73
  A new charging period is not triggered 
when employees receive paychecks pursuant to a facially nondiscri-
minatory pay system.
74
  The Court thus held that Bazemore did not re-
quire a different result.
75
 
In dissent, Justice Ginsburg argued that with each new paycheck, 
Goodyear contributed to the accumulating harm caused by its man-
agers’ sexual discrimination.
76
  The Justice posited that each payment 
infected by the previous act of discrimination should constitute an 
unlawful employment practice.
77
  Ginsburg cited to Bazemore to sup-
port this position, but at its core, the dissenting opinion presents a 
policy argument that pay-discrimination claims are unique because 
the discrete act is less conspicuous than other types of discriminatory 
acts: 
 The realities of the workplace reveal why the discrimination 
with respect to compensation that Ledbetter suffered does not fit 
within the category of singular discrete acts “easy to identify.”  A 
worker knows immediately if she is denied a promotion or trans-
fer, if she is fired or refused employment.  And promotions, trans-
 
tional origin, and argued that the EEOC charging period ran from the point of his 
termination.  Id. at 254–55.  The court denied his claim and held that his termina-
tion was merely an effect of the denial of tenure.  Id. at 257–58.  The statute of limita-
tions began running after the illegal employment decision⎯the denial of tenure.  Id. 
 70 478 U.S. 385 (1986). 
 71 Ledbetter v. Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co., 550 U.S. 618, 635 (2007) (quoting 
Bazemore, 478 U.S. at 395−96), superseded by statute, Lilly Ledbetter Fair Pay Act of 
2009, Pub. L. No. 111-2, 123 Stat. 5. 
 72 Id. at 633; id. at 645 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting). 
 73 Id. at 637 (majority opinion). 
 74 Id. 
 75 Id. 
 76 Id. at 648−49 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting). 
 77 Ledbetter, 550 U.S. at 646, 655 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting). 
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fers, hirings, and firings are generally public events, known to co-
workers.  When an employer makes a decision of such open and 
definitive character, an employee can immediately seek out an 
explanation and evaluate it for pretext.  Compensation dispari-
ties, in contrast, are often hidden from sight.  It is not unusual, 
decisions in point illustrate, for management to decline to pub-
lish employee pay levels, or for employees to keep private their 
own salaries.
78
 
The dissent then noted that Goodyear kept its employees’ sala-
ries confidential and suggested that Ledbetter did not know that 
Goodyear was discriminating against her.
79
  Essentially, Justice Gins-
burg’s opinion highlights the concealed nature of pay discrimination 
and argues that the EEOC charging period should restart each time 
that an employee is harmed by its effects.
80
  The dissent contended 
that this would avoid time barring potential plaintiffs who may not 
have known about the discrimination until after the filing period has 
expired.
81
 
B. Congress’s Response to Ledbetter 
At the conclusion of her dissent, Justice Ginsburg called on 
Congress to “correct th[e] Court’s parsimonious reading of Title 
 
 78 Id. at 649−50.  The majority did not find merit in Justice Ginsburg’s policy ar-
gument: 
     Ledbetter’s policy arguments for giving special treatment to pay 
claims find no support in the statute and are inconsistent with our pre-
cedents.  We apply the statute as written, and this means that any un-
lawful employment practice, including those involving compensation, 
must be presented to the EEOC within the period prescribed by the 
statute. 
Id. at 642−43 (majority opinion). 
 79 Id. at 650 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting).  The record does not indicate that Goo-
dyear had a PSC rule; it only indicates that Goodyear kept salaries confidential, and 
management made sure that it always locked up pay-rate tables.  Brief for Petitioner-
Appellant, supra note 33, at 26.  The Los Angeles Times reported that “Ledbetter had 
suspected for years that her male co-workers were being paid more, but she did not 
have proof until shortly before her retirement, when someone anonymously left 
documents in her work mailbox showing what three male managers earned.”  Nicole 
Gaouette, House Bill to Lift Limits on Pay Suits, L.A.TIMES, July 31, 2007, at A12.  In an 
op-ed piece, Ledbetter wrote, “How many workers know what their colleagues make?  
Do you?  I certainly didn’t until years after the fact.”  Lilly Ledbetter, Equal Work, Un-
equal Pay, CHRISTIAN SCI. MONITOR, July 31, 2007, at 9, available at 
http://www.csmonitor.com/2007/0731/p09s01-coop.html. 
 80 Ledbetter, 550 U.S. at 645−46 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting). 
 81 Id. 
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VII.”
82
  California Representative George Miller responded swiftly by 
introducing the Lilly Ledbetter Fair Pay Act of 2007
83
 in the House of 
Representatives on June 22, 2007, less than one month after Justice 
Alito handed down the Ledbetter decision.
84
  The Lilly Ledbetter Fair 
Pay Act of 2007 would have amended Title VII so that each paycheck 
affected by a past discriminatory pay decision would constitute an un-
lawful discriminatory practice for the purposes of the EEOC statute of 
limitations period.
85
 
But before the House of Representatives voted on the bill, Presi-
dent Bush issued a statement pledging to veto any legislation passed 
in response to Ledbetter.
86
  The President’s Statement of Administrative 
Policy, communicating the Bush Administration’s opposition to the 
Lilly Ledbetter Fair Pay Act of 2007, argued that the bill “would serve 
to impede justice and undermine the important goal of having alle-
gations of discrimination expeditiously resolved.”
87
  Against a back-
drop of presidential disapproval, the outlook for the Lilly Ledbetter 
Fair Pay Act of 2007 was grim from the beginning.  Nonetheless, the 
bill passed in the House on July 31, 2007, by a vote of 225 to 199, but 
the passage would prove to be a temporary victory.
88
  Congress effec-
tively killed the bill on April 23, 2008, when a Senate cloture motion 
terminated Senate debate or the possibility of voting on the bill by 
roll call.
89
 
In 2009, a new president and new Congress reopened the possi-
bility of a legislative solution to Ledbetter.  On January 8, 2009, Mary-
land Senator Barbara Mikulski introduced the LLFPA.
90
  The LLFPA, 
 
 82 Id. at 661. 
 83 H.R. 2831, 110th Cong. (2007). 
 84 153 CONG. REC. H7010 (daily ed. June 22, 2007). 
 85 Id.  The Act also would have amended the Age Discrimination in Employment 
Act of 1967 and modified the operation of both the Americans with Disabilities Act 
of 1990 and the Rehabilitation Act of 1973.  H.R. 2831. 
 86 OFFICE OF MGMT. & BUDGET, EXECUTIVE OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT, STATEMENT OF 
ADMINISTRATIVE POLICY, H.R. 2831—LILLY LEDBETTER FAIR PAY ACT OF 2007 (2007), 
available at http://www.whitehouse.gov/omb/legislative/sap/110-1/hr2831sap-r.pdf. 
 87 Id. 
 88 153 CONG. REC. D1097 (daily ed. July 31, 2007). 
 89 Megan E. Mowrey, Discriminatory Pay and Title VII: Filing a Timely Claim, 41 J. 
MARSHALL L. REV. 325, 389 (2008) (noting that the Senate cloture motion made “un-
complicated passage of the bill unlikely”). 
 90 155 CONG. REC. S228 (daily ed. Jan. 8, 2009) (statement of Sen. Mikulski).  The 
Senate and House passed the LLFPA on January 22, 2009, and January 27, 2009, re-
spectively.  155 CONG. REC. S775 (daily ed. Jan. 22, 2009); 155 CONG. REC. H556 (daily 
ed. Jan. 27, 2009).  President Obama signed the bill into law on January 29, 2009.  
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using the same language as the 2007 bill, amended Title VII and the 
Age Discrimination in Employment Act of 1967 and modified the op-
eration of the Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990 and the Reha-
bilitation Act of 1973.
91
  Section 3 of the LLFPA, which is the crux of 
the new law, amended section 706(e) of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 
and directly addressed the core criticism against Ledbetter: 
[A]n unlawful employment practice occurs, with respect to dis-
crimination in compensation in violation of this title, when a dis-
criminatory compensation decision or other practice is adopted, 
when an individual becomes subject to a discriminatory compen-
sation decision or other practice, or when an individual is affected 
by application of a discriminatory compensation decision or other 
practice, including each time wages, benefits, or other compensation is 
paid, resulting in whole or in part from such a decision or other 
practice.
92
 
Significantly, the statute limits damages so that aggrieved parties may 
only recover back pay for up to two years prior to the filing of the 
charge.
93
 
Section 6 of the LLFPA reveals Congress’s intent that the statute 
apply retroactively to claims based on pay decisions made prior to the 
statute’s enactment.
94
  The statute reads, “This Act, and the amend-
ments made by this Act, take effect as if enacted on May 28, 2007,” 
which was the day before the Supreme Court decided Ledbetter.
95
  Ra-
ther than protect only future victims of pay discrimination, the statute 
“attempts to eradicate Ledbetter root and branch—as if it were never 
the law.”
96
  In light of the Court’s holding in Plaut v. Spendthrift Farm,
97
 
Congress appears to have acted within its authority by permitting 
courts to retroactively apply the new law.
98
  Plaintiffs whose claims 
 
Sheryl Gay Stolberg, Obama Signs Equal-Pay Legislation, N.Y. TIMES, 
http://www.nytimes.com/2009/01/30/us/politics/30ledbetter-
web.html?_r=1&ref=lilly_m_ledbetter 
 91 Lilly Ledbetter Fair Pay Act of 2009, Pub. L. No. 111-2, pmbl., 123 Stat. 5, 5. 
 92 Id. § 3, 123 Stat. at 5–6 (emphasis added). 
 93 Id. § 3, 123 Stat. at 6. 
 94 Id. § 6, 123 Stat. at 7. 
 95 Id.; Ledbetter v. Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co., 550 U.S. 618, 618 (2007), super-
seded by statute, Lilly Ledbetter Fair Pay Act of 2009, Pub. L. No. 111-2, 123 Stat. 5. 
 96 Charles Sullivan, Sullivan on the Retroactivity of the Ledbetter Fair Pay Act, 
WORKPLACE PROF BLOG, Feb. 9, 2009, http://lawprofessors.typepad.com/ 
laborprof_blog/2009/02/sullivan-on-t-1.html (follow “Retroactivity.doc” hyperlink). 
 97 514 U.S. 211 (1995). 
 98 Sullivan, supra note 96 (“[T]he Plaut Court was receptive to Congress changing 
the law for pending cases, stating that any bar on prescribing rules of decision for the 
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were once dead in the wake of Ledbetter may now proceed with dis-
crimination suits premised on pay decisions made years ago. 
99
 
The LLFPA clearly signifies a victory for employees and Ledbet-
ter’s critics and dissenting justices.  The statute lengthens the window 
for pay-discrimination claims so that discrimination remains actiona-
ble for as long as it affects an employee’s compensation.
100
  Two ele-
ments of the LLFPA’s operation, however, limit its ability to compen-
sate some victims of pay discrimination appropriately.  First, 
aggrieved employees may only recover back pay for up to two years 
preceding the filing of their claim.
101
  A plaintiff like Lilly Ledbetter, 
for example, could only recover two years of back pay despite having 
received disparate pay for almost twenty years.  Second, Title VII 
claims based on pay discrimination remain subject to the EEOC’s 
180-day statute of limitations period.
102
  Employees who fail to discov-
er pay discrimination until six months after their last paycheck re-
main remediless. 
These two particular limitations have the potential to bar relief 
unfairly from employees whose employers promulgate PSC rules.  In 
such workplaces, employees have a difficult time discovering whether 
their employer is paying them fairly.  If the employee is fortunate 
enough to uncover the discrimination, she is only eligible for two 
years of back pay even if she received disparate pay for decades.  Ad-
ditionally, a PSC rule may conceal wage discrimination for the entire 
length of the EEOC charging period—that is, 180 days after an em-
ployee’s final paycheck—and thus leave employees without recourse 
if they manage to uncover the disparate pay after their tenure with 
the employer. 
Additional legislation is necessary to prevent PSC rules from in-
terfering with the rights accorded to employees by Title VII.  The so-
lution, however, does not involve altering the 180-day charging pe-
riod or the two-year limit on back pay.  These elements of Title VII 
represent important political compromises and encourage the 
prompt processing of discrimination claims, and thus should not be 
 
judiciary in pending cases ‘does not take hold when Congress amend[s] applicable 
law.’” (quoting Plaut, 514 U.S. at 216)). 
 99 The new law cannot revitalize Lilly Ledbetter’s claims, however, because the 
Court, in Plaut, held that the separation-of-powers doctrine prohibited Congress 
from reviving suits in which a final judgment has been entered.  Id. 
 100 Lilly Ledbetter Fair Pay Act of 2009, Pub. L. No. 111-2, § 3, 123 Stat. 5, 5–6. 
 101 Id. § 3, 123 Stat. at 6. 
 102 See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(e)(1) (2006). 
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disturbed.  Further legislation must seek to eradicate the root of the 
problem⎯PSC rules. 
III. AN OVERVIEW OF PSC RULES 
PSC rules are workplace rules that forbid employees from dis-
cussing their compensation with coworkers.
103
  Employers may prom-
ulgate these rules in an employment manual or orally and informal-
ly.
104
  Employers may convey PSC rules “at the time of hiring or at 
some later point during” an employee’s tenure.
105
  The grant of a 
raise is an example of a post-hiring situation in which some employ-
ers feel that they must communicate expectations of pay secrecy to 
employees.
106
  In addition to different modes of promulgation, PSC 
rules also differ in scope.  While most formal PSC rules forbid wage 
discussion in all forms at the workplace, some employers promulgate 
benign PSC rules that prohibit only discussion of “confidential in-
formation.”
107
  For example, employers often forbid members of their 
payroll departments from disclosing compensation information “ob-
tained in the course of [their] duties.”
108
  Typical PSC rules, whether 
informal or formal, stress the importance of maintaining the confi-
dentiality of compensation information and provide for disciplinary 
action in the event that an employee discloses her wage.
109
 
PSC rules are a subset of broader employer rules that limit what 
employees may say while at work.
110
  Rules restricting employees’ right 
to speak freely in the workplace take many different forms.  Sexual-
 
 103 Rafael Gely & Leonard Bierman, Pay Secrecy/Confidentiality Rules and the National 
Labor Relations Act, 6 U. PA. J. LAB. & EMP. L. 121, 124 (2003). 
 104 Leonard Bierman & Rafael Gely, Love, Sex and Politics. Sure. Salary? No Way, 25 
BERKELEY J. EMP. & LAB. L. 167, 171 (2004). 
 105 Id. 
 106 See, e.g., NLRB v. Main St. Terrace Care Ctr., 218 F.3d 531, 535 (6th Cir. 2000) 
(“[The employer] informed [employees] that they would be receiving a fifty-cent 
raise.  [The employer] ‘told [the employees], together, not to say anything to the 
other girls in the kitchen because they were not getting a raise.’”). 
 107 Gely & Bierman, supra note 103, at 124. 
 108 See id. 
 109 For a good example of the language used in a typical formal PSC rule, see Fre-
dericksburg Glass and Mirror, Inc., 323 N.L.R.B. 165, 168 (1997).  Upon hiring, the em-
ployer distributed a handbook to many or all employees that included the following 
PSC rule: “An employee’s earnings are a confidential matter between the employee 
and his earnings supervisor.  Earnings may not be discussed among fellow employees 
and any such discussion will result in dismissal and/or disciplinary action at the su-
pervisor’s discretion.”  Id. 
 110 Gely & Bierman, supra note 103, at 124–25. 
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harassment policies are an example of workplace rules that restrict 
employees’ speech.
111
  Policies that attempt to eliminate workplace 
communication in any language other than English are another ex-
ample.
112
 
Academic researchers have not yet studied the prevalence of 
PSC rules;
113
 however, some data suggests that the policies are quite 
common in American workplaces.  An informal, online poll provides 
an approximation of how widespread PSC rules are in the 
workplace.
114
  The survey, taken by HRnext.com, polled 329 unidenti-
fied individuals and found that “over one-third” had a formal PSC 
rule in effect.
115
  Only one in fourteen respondents said that they had 
“adopted a ‘pay openness’ policy.”
116
  And 51 percent reported that 
no policy regarding pay confidentiality existed in their workplaces.
117
  
This figure, however, may not reflect the number of workplaces that 
“communicate expectations of employee pay confidentiality informal-
ly” without a written policy.
118
 
 
 111 See generally Deborah Epstein, Can a “Dumb Ass Woman” Achieve Equality in the 
Workplace? Running the Gauntlet of Hostile Environment Harassing Speech, 84 GEO. L.J. 
399 (1996) (discussing First Amendment defenses to Title VII sexual-harassment 
claims that are based on speech alone); John F. Wirenius, Actions as Words, Words as 
Actions: Sexual Harassment Law, the First Amendment and Verbal Acts, 28 WHITTIER L. REV. 
905 (2007) (discussing the tension between sexual-harassment law and the First 
Amendment). 
 112 Gely & Bierman, supra note 103, at 124–25.  The EEOC has issued guidelines 
classifying workplace English-only rules as a form of national-origin discrimination 
unless the rules are limited in scope and the employer can prove a legitimate busi-
ness justification for the rule.  Lisa L. Behm, Protecting Linguistic Minorities Under Title 
VII: The Need for Judicial Deference to the EEOC Guidelines on Discrimination Because of Na-
tional Origin, 81 MARQ. L. REV. 569, 570–71 (1998).  These guidelines, however, are 
not binding on courts, and a number of different federal appellate courts have 
upheld English-only rules.  Id. at 570–72.  See generally Garcia v. Spun Steak Co., 998 
F.2d 1480 (9th Cir. 1993) (rejecting plaintiffs’ claim that an English-only policy vi-
olated Title VII because it had a disparate impact on Hispanic employees); Garcia v. 
Gloor, 618 F.2d 264 (5th Cir. 1980) (holding that an employer’s rule that required 
employees to speak English in public areas was not discriminatory as applied to a dis-
charged worker who was capable of speaking English). 
 113 See Matthew A. Edwards, The Law and Social Norms of Pay Secrecy, 26 BERKELEY J. 
EMP. & LAB. L. 41, 48 n.42 (2005). 
 114 See id. (“Given the lack of academic research on point, it is reasonable to use 
any relevant available sources.”). 
 115 See Gely & Bierman, supra note 103, at 125. 
 116 Id. 
 117 Id. 
 118 Bierman & Gely, supra note 104, at 171. 
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Employers and academic researchers have cited four primary 
benefits of PSC rules that help employers accomplish managerial ob-
jectives: (1) maintenance of a peaceful workplace; (2) increased 
workplace privacy for employees; (3) labor-market immobility; and 
(4) greater freedom for employers regarding compensation deci-
sions.  These purported benefits overlap so that some of the benefits 
share common elements.  For example, the avoidance of jealousy 
among employees resulting from wage secrecy supposedly produces 
the first and fourth purported benefits⎯decreased workplace conflict 
and more accurate compensation systems.
119
  Some of these justifica-
tions may arguably provide employees with incidental benefits; how-
ever, the purported benefits generally undermine employees’ inter-
ests. 
The first alleged benefit is that PSC rules help employers main-
tain a peaceful workplace.
120
  Employers argue that PSC rules help 
avoid conflicts and foster peace in two ways.
121
  First, PSC rules can 
help reduce jealousy among employees and prevent loss of employee 
morale by concealing pay differentials.
122
  Systems for rewarding indi-
viduals are imperfect and difficult to communicate to employees.
123
  
Without PSC rules, employees may hear about coworkers’ wages but 
not about the reasons for any wage discrepancies.
124
  Alternatively, 
they may fail to understand those reasons even if known.
125
  A satisfied 
employee may quickly become a malcontent if she learns that the 
employer is paying more to a similarly situated coworker.
126
  The 
second way that PSC rules help to prevent workplace conflict is by li-
miting “influence behavior” that may result from pay-openness poli-
cies.
127
  Influence behavior occurs when employees attempt to per-
suade their supervisors “to give them a raise.”
128
  This type of behavior 
can result in conflict between a calculating employee and her super-
 
 119 See infra text accompanying notes 122–126, 149–151. 
 120 Adrienne Colella, Exposing Pay Secrecy, 32 ACAD. MGMT. REV. 55, 61 (2007). 
 121 See id. 
 122 Id. 
 123 See Bierman & Gely, supra note 104, at 178. 
 124 See id.; Gely & Bierman, supra note 103, at 129. 
 125 See Bierman & Gely, supra note 104, at 178; Gely & Bierman, supra note 103, at 
129. 
 126 Bierman & Gely, supra note 104, at 178. 
 127 See id. (internal quotations omitted). 
 128 Id. 
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visor or other coworkers.
129
  Some economists argue that the cost of 
the influencing behavior and its resulting conflict make PSC rules 
more efficient than pay-openness policies.
130
 
 The second claimed benefit of PSC rules is enhanced 
workplace privacy for employees.
131
  Employee surveys have found 
that most employees favor PSC rules.
132
  The strong norm in Ameri-
can culture that disapproves of discussing compensation strengthens 
the reliability of these findings.
133
  Enhanced privacy may offer inci-
dental benefits to employees, but employers enjoy the greatest 
“perks” resulting from enhanced privacy in the workplace, such as re-
tention, satisfaction, commitment, and performance.
134
 
The third asserted benefit to employers from PSC rules is labor-
market immobility.
135
  Many productive employees, who might other-
wise leave their employers if they knew what their coworkers were 
paid, stay because they are ignorant of their relatively low pay.
136
  Ad-
ditionally, many workers, staying with their employers only during 
economic downturns, may wait for the economy to improve before 
moving on to better employment opportunities.
137
  Pay openness and 
employees’ ability to discuss job offers that coworkers receive facili-
tates this type of labor mobility.
138
  PSC rules enable employers to lim-
it labor-market mobility by preventing employee opportunism.
139
  
Aside from promoting workplace stability, labor-market immobility 
has the additional benefit for employers of avoiding the costs inci-
dental to labor transitions, such as recruiting and training replace-
ment employees.
140
  This particular benefit helps illustrate the point 
 
 129 Id. 
 130 See id.; Colella, supra note 120, at 61. 
 131 Colella, supra note 120, at 62. 
 132 Id. 
 133 See Bierman & Gely, supra note 104, at 168 (citing Abby Ellin, Want to Stop the 
Conversation? Just Mention Your Finances, N.Y. TIMES, July 20, 2003, § 3, at 9) (observing 
that discussion of compensation is generally considered “crass” in America); Colella, 
supra note 120, at 62. 
 134 Colella, supra note 120, at 62. 
 135 Id. 
 136 See id. 
 137 Bierman & Gely, supra note 104, at 179. 
 138 Id. 
 139 Id. 
 140 See Colella, supra note 120, at 62. 
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that the perks enjoyed by employers from promulgating PSC rules of-
ten undermine employees’ interests.
141
 
The fourth purported benefit of PSC rules is that they give em-
ployers more freedom to set individual employees’ compensation and 
to establish the relevant factors for determining compensation.  PSC 
rules provide the enhanced freedom to make compensation decisions 
in two ways: (1) by permitting employers to reward employees for 
firm-specific investments and (2) by increasing the breadth of the 
pay-distribution scale through reduced potential for coworker con-
flict.  As an initial matter, PSC rules allow employers to reward em-
ployees who make firm-specific investments.
142
  Employees frequently 
confront alternatives concerning how their time is best spent.
143
  On 
the one hand, they have opportunities at their workplace that will 
help their careers at that particular firm but will not increase their 
marketability in the larger labor market.
144
  On the other hand, they 
can spend that same time working on projects that make them more 
marketable in the broader workforce.
145
  Employers often help em-
ployees deal with this dilemma by giving them large salary increases 
to reward firm-specific commitments.
146
  These types of raises are 
highly subjective, difficult for coworkers to understand, and poten-
tially controversial.
147
  PSC rules help managers reward employees’ 
firm-specific investment without causing workplace strife.
148
 
Additionally, PSC rules provide managers with latitude in com-
pensation decisions by increasing the possible pay-distribution scale.  
This rationale involves the potential conflict resulting from coworker 
jealousy under a pay-openness policy.
149
  If employees can discuss 
their compensation, managers may feel the need to narrow the pay-
distribution range to avoid conflicts.
150
  PSC rules enable managers 
“to provide maximal separation in reward for performance” without 
fearing conflict from those who are at the lower end of the pay 
 
 141 See supra text accompanying note 134.  
 142 Bierman & Gely, supra note 104, at 179–81. 
 143 See id. at 180. 
 144 See id. 
 145 See id. 
 146 Id. 
 147 See id. at 180–81. 
 148 See Bierman & Gely, supra note 104, at 181. 
 149 See supra text accompanying notes 122–126. 
 150 Colella, supra note 120, at 61. 
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scale.
151
  In the absence of PSC rules, employers may establish low pay 
scales rather than reward valuable employees. 
This tendency towards a narrower and lower pay scale is another 
example of how a particular consequence stemming from PSC rules 
represents a benefit to the employer and a detriment to some em-
ployees.  Employers may assign valuable employees to the low end of 
wide-ranging compensation scales for illegal reasons, such as using 
race or gender as a motive, or simply by mistake the worth of such 
employees.  These employees have valid grounds for challenging em-
ployers’ pay decisions and should have the means to discover the dif-
ferential between their compensation and that of their peers.  Some-
times conflict is necessary to correct illegitimate equalities because 
employees cannot always trust their employers to establish accurate 
pay scales.  If an employer makes a mistake in evaluating an employee 
or discriminatory animus factors into an employer’s pay decision, 
avoidance of conflict benefits only the employer. 
The consequences of PSC rules have their own benefits and de-
triments from the employees’ perspective.  Possibly the greatest bene-
fit to employees is the enhanced sense of privacy that results from pay 
secrecy.  While pay openness may offer employees the opportunity to 
evaluate their own salaries more accurately, survey data suggests that 
employees favor PSC rules because of the heightened sense of priva-
cy.
152
  The more valuable employees also benefit when employers are 
free to expand pay scales so that pay accurately reflects perfor-
mance.
153
 
On the other hand, employers, to the detriment of their em-
ployees, enjoy two of the benefits stemming from PSC rules.  First, 
decreasing labor mobility means that PSC rules discourage employees 
from moving to jobs that fit better or pay more.
154
  Second, employers 
claim that PSC rules help organizations correct pay inequities without 
facing employees’ negative reactions and avoid claims of discrimina-
tion or other wrongdoing.
155
  In this case, the damage suffered by 
employees is clear.  Employees have an interest in exposing pay in-
 
 151 Id. 
 152 See id. at 62.  This heightened sense of privacy likely benefits employers more 
than employees.  See supra text accompanying notes 131–134. 
 153 Colella, supra note 120, at 61.  Some valuable employees may not benefit be-
cause of discrimination or employer error. 
 154 Id. at 60, 62. 
 155 Id. at 61. 
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equalities, whether they are motivated by discrimination or not, so 
that the employer can correct them. 
IV. CURRENT STATUTORY, ADMINISTRATIVE, AND JUDICIAL LANDSCAPE 
GOVERNING PSC RULES 
Despite the prevalence of PSC rules, federal and state legislators 
have recognized the potential downside of such policies and have 
enacted legislation that treats the policies unfavorably.  The NLRA is 
federal legislation governing union workers and certain nonunion 
employee conduct.
156
  The responsibility for interpreting and apply-
ing the NLRA lies with the NLRB.
157
  The NLRB and reviewing courts 
consistently hold that PSC rules violate employees’ right to engage in 
concerted activity under the NLRA and constitute unfair labor prac-
tices.
158
  Additionally, several state legislatures have recognized the po-
tential dangers engendered by PSC rules and have passed laws that 
explicitly prohibit them. 
A. The NLRA and PSC Rules 
Congress enacted the NLRA in 1935 in response to strikes and 
industrial strife resulting from some employers’ efforts to deny their 
workers the right to organize and bargain collectively.
159
  By providing 
workers with full freedom to self-organize and choose bargaining 
representatives, Congress tried to level bargaining inequalities be-
tween employees and employers to avoid future obstructions to the 
flow of commerce.
160
 
The extension of rights designed to protect workers is found in 
section 7 of the NLRA, entitled “Rights of employees, as to organiza-
tion, collective bargaining, etc.,” which grants workers the unequi-
vocal right to join labor unions and engage in “other concerted activ-
ities” for collective bargaining or other “mutual aid or protection.”
161
  
Under section 8(a)(1), employers that “interfere with, restrain, or 
 
 156 Gely & Bierman, supra note 103, at 131.  See generally 29 U.S.C. §§ 151−160 
(2006). 
 157 See § 153 (announcing that the NLRB will continue in existence and describing 
certain features of the NLRB); § 160; NLRB v. Seven-Up Bottling Co. of Miami, 344 
U.S. 344, 348 (1953) (“It is the business of the Board to give coordinated effect to the 
policies of the Act.”). 
 158 See, e.g., cases cited infra note 176. 
 159 § 151. 
 160 Id. 
 161 Id. § 157. 
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coerce employees in the exercise of the rights guaranteed in [section 
7]” thereby commit unfair labor practices and violate the NLRA.
162
  
To determine whether an employer has committed a section 8 viola-
tion, a three-part test generally applies.
163
  First, the NLRB or review-
ing court asks whether the employer’s practice adversely affects its 
employees’ section 7 rights.
164
  Next, if the practice does infringe on 
section 7 rights, the employer must demonstrate a “substantial and 
legitimate business reason” for the conduct or employment prac-
tice.
165
  Finally, the NLRB or court applies a balancing test to deter-
mine whether the section 7 rights outweigh the employer’s proffered 
business justification.
166
 
The NLRB does not actively seek out unfair labor practices.  Ra-
ther, the Board reviews employment practices after an employee, un-
ion, or employer submits a formal allegation of an NLRA violation.
167
  
Under this scheme, the NLRB will not address a violation that em-
ployees accept or support.
168
  This reactive enforcement scheme 
stands in contrast to other administrative agencies, such as the Secur-
ities and Exchange Commission, which have the power to investigate 
and enforce without waiting for complaints.
169
 
Section 10 provides the NLRB’s remedies for unfair labor prac-
tices.
170
  If the Board finds that an employer has committed an unfair 
labor practice, it shall issue a cease-and-desist order and “take such 
affirmative action . . . as will effectuate the policies of th[e] [Act].”
171
  
The NLRB’s affirmative action is limited to reparative remedies, such 
as reinstatement and back pay.
172
  The available remedies illustrate 
the Act’s general purpose, which is remedial rather than punitive.
173
  
The remedies aim to end the unfair labor practice and remove the 
 
 162 Id. § 158 (referring to § 157, which is section 7 of the NLRA). 
 163 See Medeco Sec. Locks, Inc. v. NLRB., 142 F.3d 733, 745 (4th Cir. 1998). 
 164 Id. 
 165 Id. 
 166 Id. 
 167 Bierman & Gely, supra note 104, at 188. 
 168 Id. 
 169 See 15 U.S.C. § 78(u) (2006). 
 170 See 29 U.S.C. § 160(c) (2006). 
 171 Id. 
 172 See id.; Consol. Edison Co. v. NLRB, 305 U.S. 197, 236 (1938). 
 173 Teamsters Local 372 v. Detroit Newspapers, 956 F. Supp. 753, 758 (E.D. Mich. 
1997). 
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consequences of the violation from the workplace.
174
  The NLRB may 
not punish guilty employers beyond what is necessary to rid the 
workplace of the violation’s effects.
175
 
The NLRB has heard complaints from workers regarding PSC 
rules on many occasions.
176
  In the first step of the Board’s three-part 
test for determining an unfair labor practice, the NLRB has consis-
tently held that PSC rules encroach on workers’ section 7 right to en-
gage in “concerted activity for . . . mutual aid or protection.”
177
  Wage 
levels are a chief concern of organizational activity,
178
 and dissatisfac-
tion stemming from low wages is a key motivator of concerted activi-
ty.
179
  In light of this, wage discussion is considered a protected activi-
ty.
180
  Unqualified PSC rules, by nature, obstruct this recognized form 
of concerted activity, and therefore, courts routinely find that PSC 
rules obstruct employees’ section 7 rights.
181
 
After finding that an employer’s prohibition of wage discussion 
impedes protected activity, the NLRB or a reviewing court moves to 
the second and third steps: determining whether a legitimate busi-
ness justification exists for the PSC rule and, if so, whether that justi-
fication outweighs the employees’ section 7 right to discuss wages.  
The most common justification offered by employers in defense of 
PSC rules is that the policies reduce jealousy among employees.
182
  
The NLRB and courts consistently reject this argument and hold that 
the potential for limiting jealousy among employees is not a justifia-
ble business reason to inhibit employees from engaging in protected 
concerted activity.
183
  Where employers have no legitimate business 
justification to weigh against their infringement on section 7 rights, 
 
 174 Consol. Edison, 305 U.S. at 236. 
 175 Id. 
 176 See generally NLRB v. Main St. Terrace Care Ctr., 218 F.3d 531 (6th Cir. 2000) 
(holding that oral promulgation of a PSC rule constituted an unfair labor practice); 
Wilson Trophy Co. v. NLRB, 989 F.2d 1502 (8th Cir. 1993) (holding that an employ-
er violated its employees’ section 7 rights by unconditionally forbidding wage discus-
sion in the warehouse); Jeannette Corp. v. NLRB, 532 F.2d 916 (3d Cir. 1976) (hold-
ing that an employer committed an unfair labor practice by maintaining an 
unqualified, unwritten PSC rule). 
 177 29 U.S.C. § 157 (2006); see, e.g., cases cited supra note 176. 
 178 Main St., 218 F.3d at 537. 
 179 See Jeannette, 532 F.2d at 919. 
 180 See Gely & Bierman, supra note 103, at 131. 
 181 See, e.g., cases cited supra note 176. 
 182 See Jeannette, 532 F.2d at 919; Gely & Bierman, supra note 103, at 129.  
 183 Gely & Bierman, supra note 103, at 129; see, e.g., Jeannette, 532 F.2d at 919. 
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the NLRB and reviewing courts reach the unavoidable conclusion 
that PSC rules are unfair labor practices that constitute section 
8(a)(1) violations.
184
 
But an important exception applies to the NLRB’s consistent, 
unfavorable treatment of PSC rules.  Modified PSC rules that prohibit 
employee wage discussion only during working hours are generally 
acceptable because they support an employer’s legitimate business 
interest of maintaining workplace efficiency.
185
  To avoid unfair labor 
practices, employers must not prohibit wage discussion during 
“breaks, . . . lunch time, in the restroom, and before and after work 
while employees [are in the workplace].”
186
 
The manner in which an employer communicates its prohibition 
of wage discussion is immaterial to a court’s unfair-labor-practice de-
termination: a rule may constitute a violation regardless of the mode 
of communication.  The NLRB and reviewing courts thus analyze 
orally promulgated PSC rules no differently than formal, written PSC 
rules.
187
  The potential for orally communicated PSC rules to violate 
the NLRA is important for several reasons.  First, experts speculate 
that informal, unwritten PSC rules are very common and that pay 
secrecy is “the unwritten law” across American workplaces.
188
  Second, 
verbal communication of workplace policies may be particularly 
coercive because employees perceive that the employer is more likely 
to enforce such policies than a policy hidden in an employment ma-
nual that employees may view as mere boilerplate.
189
  Finally, if the 
Board and reviewing courts did not consider orally promulgated PSC 
rules to be unfair labor practices, employers could easily evade the 
NLRA by issuing PSC rules orally.
190
 
The Board and reviewing courts have strongly protected the 
right of employees to discuss their wages.  Two examples of employer 
action that violate the NLRA are illustrative of employers’ very limited 
ability to institute PSC rules.  First, an employer need not actually en-
 
 184 29 U.S.C. § 158(a)(1) (2006) (“It shall be an unfair labor practice for an em-
ployer to interfere with, restrain, or coerce employees in the exercise of the rights 
guaranteed in section 157 . . . .”). 
 185 See Jeannette, 532 F.2d at 919 (citing Republic Aviation Corp. v. NLRB, 324 U.S. 
793, 803 n.10 (1945)). 
 186 Wilson Trophy Co. v. NLRB, 989 F.2d 1502, 1511 (8th Cir. 1993). 
 187 See NLRB v. Main St. Terrace Care Ctr., 218 F.3d 531, 538 (6th Cir. 2000). 
 188 Bierman & Gely, supra note 104, at 171. 
 189 See Main St., 218 F.3d at 538. 
 190 Id. 
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force a PSC rule to violate section 8(a)(1).
191
  The mere existence of a 
PSC rule constitutes an unfair labor practice, regardless of whether 
an employer ignores or enforces the policy.
192
  The rationale behind 
prohibiting even unenforced rules is that “mere maintenance” of a 
pay-secrecy policy may “chill” employee wage discussion, a protected 
section 7 employee activity.
193
  Even intentional failure to enforce a 
facially unlawful PSC rule will not vindicate the rule.
194
 
The NLRA’s proscription of PSC rules is also interpreted to out-
law provisions in employment manuals that do not explicitly forbid 
pay discussions so long as employees could reasonably construe a 
provision’s language to prohibit section 7 activity.
195
  In Cintas Corp. v. 
NLRB, an employee handbook simply prohibited the disclosure of 
“any information concerning . . . partners.”
196
  Clear evidence existed 
to demonstrate that employees did not interpret the provision as re-
stricting their right to disclose wage information: the employees post-
ed pictures of themselves with their wages around the workplace.
197
  
Despite the ambiguous language of the policy and the fact that the 
employees did not interpret the policy as a PSC rule, the court agreed 
with the Board’s determination that the policy was capable of imped-
ing employees’ section 7 rights.
198
  In sum, an employment policy may 
violate section 8(a)(1) even though it does not explicitly forbid wage 
discussion, employees do not interpret it as forbidding wage discus-
sion, and the employer does not enforce it.
199
 
The remedies imposed by the NLRB after it has determined that 
a PSC rule violates employees’ section 7 rights are similar to the re-
medies for any unfair labor practice.  In accordance with the remedi-
al purpose of the NLRA,
200
 remedies for employees in workplaces with 
PSC rules are reparative rather than punitive.  The NLRB and review-
ing courts provide a number of different remedies to eliminate the 
 
 191 Cintas Corp. v. NLRB, 482 F.3d 463, 466 (D.C. Cir. 2007). 
 192 See id. 
 193 See Guardsmark, LLC v. NLRB, 475 F.3d 369, 374 (D.C. Cir. 2007). 
 194 Cintas, 482 F.3d at 466. 
 195 Id. at 467. 
 196 482 F.3d 463, 465 (D.C. Cir. 2007).  The company referred to all employees as 
“partners.”  Id. 
 197 Id. at 467. 
 198 Id. 
 199 See supra notes 191−198 and accompanying text. 
 200 E.g., Hoffman Plastic Compounds, Inc. v. NLRB, 535 U.S. 137, 152 n.6 (2002); 
Clover Fork Coal Co. v. NLRB, 97 F.2d 331, 335 (6th Cir. 1938). 
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PSC rule and its effects.
201
  These remedies fall into two categories: 
remedies designed to repair the entire workplace and remedies de-
signed to make whole individual employees whom their employer un-
lawfully discharged pursuant to an illegal PSC rule.
202
 
The Board uses two primary remedies to repair a workplace pre-
viously governed by an unlawful PSC rule.  First, the NLRB will 
mandate that the employer rescind the unlawful policy.
203
  If the em-
ployer formalized the policy in an employment manual, the NLRB 
may order the employer to print new manuals and to redistribute the 
revised version to all employees.
204
  Second, the Board will order the 
employer to post notices in the workplace informing its employees of 
the affirmative remedies provided to the unlawfully terminated em-
ployees and notifying them that the policy is no longer in effect.
205
 
The Board generally provides unlawfully discharged employees 
with three principal remedies.  First, the NLRB will order the em-
ployer to reinstate all employees terminated for violating a PSC 
rule.
206
  If those employees’ jobs no longer exist, the employer must 
 
 201 The NLRB promulgated the remedies in this section in Fredericksburg Glass and 
Mirror, Inc., 323 N.L.R.B. 165 (1997).  The facts of the case provided the NLRB an 
opportunity to grant every remedy typical of cases involving unlawful PSC rules.  The 
Fredericksburg order is a representative example of how the Board approaches cases 
involving unlawful PSC rules, and it will guide this discussion of PSC-rule remedies.  
In other pertinent case law, the Board or reviewing court provided for one or two of 
the following sets of remedies cited to in Fredericksburg. 
 202 Generally, the NLRB will order both sets of remedies unless the employer did 
not discharge an employee pursuant to the PSC rule, in which case the Board may 
order only the first set of remedies.  NLRB v. Brookshire Grocery Co., 919 F.2d 359 (5th 
Cir. 1990), offers an example of a case where the employer terminated the employee 
pursuant to a PSC rule, but the employee was not reinstated.  The employee encoun-
tered performance evaluations while in his supervisor’s office.  Id. at 361.  Later that 
morning, he shared the information with his fellow employees.  Id.  His supervisor 
told him that the employer was not firing him for stealing information but for reveal-
ing the wages to his coworkers.  Id.  Upon receiving an unfair labor charge from the 
discharged employee, the Administrative Law Judge (ALJ) ordered that the employer 
rescind the rule and post notice around the workplace, but the ALJ refused to reins-
tate the employee.  Id. at 362.  The Board reversed the ALJ’s order, but on appeal, 
the Fifth Circuit held that “an employee’s right to discuss wage levels freely within 
the workplace does not, and should not, extend to that employee the prerogative of 
taking company papers. . . .  Where ‘the purposes and polices of the Act would not 
be effectuated by reinstatement’ or other remedial measures, then denial of the tra-
ditional remedies accorded under the Act is proper.”  Id. at 364 (quoting NLRB v. 
Big Three Welding Equip. Co., 359 F.2d 77, 84 (5th Cir. 1966)). 
 203 See, e.g., Fredericksburg Glass and Mirror, Inc., 323 N.L.R.B. 165, 181 (1997). 
 204 See, e.g., id. 
 205 See, e.g., id. 
 206 See, e.g., id. 
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find substantially equivalent positions or dismiss replacement hires to 
make room for the reinstated employees.
207
  The employer must also 
ensure that the dismissed employees do not suffer any prejudice to 
seniority or other rights and privileges previously enjoyed.
208
  Second, 
employers are required to make whole the unlawfully discharged 
plaintiffs for their loss of earnings or other benefits by supplying back 
pay with interest.
209
  Finally, the NLRB will also order an employer to 
expunge from its records all references to the unlawful termination 
of the employees.
210
 
B. State Statutes Prohibiting PSC Rules 
In the past twenty-seven years, four state legislatures enacted sta-
tutes outlawing PSC rules: Michigan,
211
 California,
212
 Vermont,
213
 and 
Colorado.
214
  With the exception of the Colorado statute,
215
 which ap-
pears slightly broader in its protection of employees’ rights, the sta-
tutes utilize almost identical language to prohibit PSC rules.  The 
Vermont statute, typical of the state PSC prohibitions, reads as fol-
lows: 
(B) No employer may do any of the following: 
 (i) Require, as a condition of employment, that an employee 
 refrain from disclosing the amount of his or her wages 
 (ii) Require an employee to sign a waiver or other document 
 that purports to deny the employee the right to disclose the 
 amount of his or her wages 
 (iii) Discharge, formally discipline, or otherwise discriminate 
 against an employee who discloses the amount of his or her wag
 es.
216
 
 
 207 See, e.g., id. 
 208 See, e.g., id. 
 209 See, e.g., Fredericksburg Glass and Mirror, 323 N.L.R.B. at 181. 
 210 See, e.g., id. 
 211 See MICH. COMP. LAWS SERV. § 408.483a (LexisNexis, LEXIS through 2008 legis-
lation). 
 212 See CAL. LAB. CODE § 232 (West 2003). 
 213 See VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 21, § 495(a)(8)(B) (LEXIS through 2009 Sess.). 
 214 See COLO. REV. STAT. § 24-34-402(1)(h)(II)(C)(i) (LEXIS through 2009 legisla-
tion). 
 215 Rather than only protecting an employee’s right to disclose their wage, the 
Colorado statute prohibits an employer from disciplining an employee “because the 
employee inquired about, disclosed, compared, or otherwise discussed the em-
ployee’s wages.”  Id. 
 216 § 495(a)(8)(B). 
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The relief available to aggrieved employees under the statutes 
varies by state.  On one end of the spectrum, Colorado’s statute offers 
only minimal relief that is similar in substance to that available under 
the NLRA.
217
  The courts’ remedial options are limited to equitable 
remedies such as reinstatement or back pay.
218
  The California and 
Michigan statutes fall in the middle of the spectrum, imposing civil 
penalties on offending employers.
219
  The Vermont statute offers the 
strongest remedies.  In addition to back pay, reinstatement, and at-
torney’s fees, Vermont courts may impose a $10,000 civil penalty on 
offending employers and grant punitive or treble damages to plain-
tiffs.
220
  Thus, the Vermont statute is unique in two ways.  First, it is the 
only state statute to offer punitive damages to plaintiffs.  Second, the 
statute imposes on the defendant a civil fine that is presumably de-
signed to deter employers from instituting PSC rules.  The Vermont 
statute represents the most aggressive effort by a state legislature to 
punish employers and deter them from promulgating PSC rules. 
Case law involving any of the four state statutes is very sparse.  
Only two suits have been filed accusing employers of promulgating 
illegal PSC rules.
221
  The most recent case took place in 2002 after a 
California employer allegedly terminated an employee for mention-
ing to coworkers that she did not receive a bonus.
222
  The employee, 
using section 232 of the California Labor Code, which prohibits PSC 
rules, filed a tort claim for wrongful termination in violation of public 
policy.
223
  Section 232 provided the statutory hook, or tether, for the 
 
 217 See COLO. REV. STAT. § 24-34-405 (LEXIS through 2009 legislation). 
 218 See id.; Continental Title Co. v. Dist. Court of Denver, 645 P.2d 1310, 1317 
(1982) (“[T]his statute was intended to invoke only the equitable powers of the court 
and not to create a legal claim for damages.”).  
 219 CAL. LAB. CODE § 2699 (West Supp. 2010); Reo v. Lane Bryant, Inc., 536 
N.W.2d 556, 557–58 (Mich. Ct. App. 1995) (“We recognize that our construction of 
the act may result in a civil fine being the only remedy available under the act if the 
petitioner’s claim is proven . . . .  While we are cognizant of this result, we are without 
authority to change it, given our interpretation of the statutes and the Legislature’s 
failure to provide explicit remedies for violations of 13a.”). 
 220 VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 9, §§ 2458, 2461 (LEXIS through 2009 Sess.); VT. STAT. ANN. 
tit. 21, § 495b (LEXIS through 2009 Sess.). 
 221 Grant-Burton v. Covenant Care, Inc., 122 Cal. Rptr. 2d 204, 210–11 (Cal. Ct. 
App. 2002).  See generally Reo, 211 Mich. App. 364 (accusing employer of allegedly 
terminating plaintiff for disclosing her wage). 
 222 Grant-Burton, 122 Cal Rptr. 2d at 210−11. 
 223 Id. at 213. 
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employee’s public-policy claim.
224
  The statute demonstrated that pub-
lic policy disfavored PSC rules and thus supported the employee’s 
wrongful-termination claim.
225
 
V. WHY THE CURRENT STATUTORY REGIME IS INADEQUATE 
The existing statutory regime governing PSC rules is inadequate 
for three reasons.  First, most employers lack incentives to remove ex-
isting PSC rules.  Second, the existing scheme leaves a large class of 
employees unprotected.  Finally, the possibility exists that courts may 
eventually hold that the NLRA preempts state statutes that make PSC 
rules illegal. 
A. The Futility of the NLRA 
The chief deficiency of the NLRA’s ability to protect employees 
against PSC rules is that the Act provides only limited incentive for 
employers to remove PSC rules from their policies.  The overarching 
purpose of the NLRA is to offer victims of unfair labor practices re-
medial relief without resorting to punitive damages or civil penal-
ties.
226
  The NLRA limits the Board by providing remedial relief even 
in situations where it believes that punitive damages or fines would 
best “effectuate the policies of the Act.”
227
  The limited remedies pro-
vided to employees and workplaces restrained by PSC rules illustrate 
the NLRA’s underlying policy of repairing rather than punishing.
228
 
Having only remedial powers, the NLRB cannot effectively deter 
workplace PSC rules.  Workplace prohibitions against certain activi-
ties, even if unenforced, have the effect of preventing or chilling 
 
 224 Public-policy claims must be “tethered” to statutory or constitutional provi-
sions.  Id. at 213–14. 
 225 Id. at 214. 
 226 Teamsters Local 372 v. Detroit Newspapers, 956 F. Supp. 753, 758 (E.D. Mich. 
1997). 
 227 Consol. Edison Co. v. NLRB, 305 U.S. 197, 235–36 (1938) (“[T]his authority to 
order affirmative action does not go so far as to convey a punitive jurisdiction . . . 
even though the Board be of the opinion that the policies of the Act might be effec-
tuated by such an order.”).  The NLRB is also not permitted to take punitive action 
with the hope of deterring a particular unfair labor practice.  Florida Steel Corp. v. 
NLRB, 620 F.2d 79, 83 (5th Cir. 1980) (“While . . . a penalty might have the effect of 
deterring persons from violating the Act . . . , it is not warranted.”). 
 228 Republic Steel Corp. v. NLRB, 311 U.S. 7, 10 (1940); see, e.g., Wilson Trophy 
Co. v. NLRB, 989 F.2d 1502 (8th Cir. 1993) (providing for reinstatement and back 
pay for employees who were fired for violating PSC rules); NLRB v. Brookshire Gro-
cery Co., 919 F.2d 359 (5th Cir. 1990) (requiring employer to eliminate its PSC rule 
even though plaintiff was not entitled to relief). 
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those activities.  Under the NLRA, employers may maintain unen-
forced PSC rules with the objective of chilling wage discussion.  In the 
employer’s worst-case scenario, an employee would bring the PSC 
rule to the Board’s attention, and the Board would issue a cease-and-
desist order.  The harshest penalty that an unenforced PSC rule will 
precipitate is an order to comply with the law despite the significant 
chilling effect that the rule itself can have on section 7 rights.  Even if 
an employer enforces the PSC rule and fires violators, the employer 
will only be slightly worse off than if the employer had always com-
plied with the law because the remedy is merely reinstatement and 
back pay.
229
  As the NLRA is reactive in nature—that is, a petitioner 
does not enforce it without a claim—most PSC rules will not be 
brought to the NLRB’s attention.
230
  Ignoring the law is easier and 
more efficient for employers because the NLRA does not adequately 
incentivize compliance.
231
 
The decline of unionization in American workplaces
232
 as well as 
the fact that nonunion employees know little about their rights under 
 
 229 If the employer does not hire a replacement, it will pay for unrealized labor 
costs—back pay—between termination and reinstatement.  Alternatively, if the em-
ployer hires a replacement, it will pay double the normal wage of one employee. 
 230 See Bierman & Gely, supra note 104, at 188–89. 
 231 Gely & Bierman, supra note 103, at 149 (“In this context . . . it is much easier 
and efficient to simply ignore the law.”). 
 232 Although the rate of unionization among American workers has steadily de-
clined over recent decades, legislation pending in Congress, if passed, may bring 
about increased levels of unionization in the future.  The Employee Free Choice Act 
of 2009 (EFCA) amends section 9 of the NLRA to make it easier for unions to gain 
certification as employees’ bargaining agent.  See H.R. 1409, S. 560, 111th Cong. 
(2009).  Under the current system, the process leading to union certification begins 
when “any person or labor organization acting on behalf of a substantial number of 
employees” files a petition.  29 C.F.R. § 101.17 (2009).  The petitioner must also pro-
duce evidence that a “substantial number”—that is, at least thirty percent—of em-
ployees want the union to represent them.  Id. §§ 101.17, 101.18(a).  This evidence 
generally takes the form of signed authorization cards.  § 101.17.  Once a union 
claims to represent the majority of employees in a workplace, the employer has the 
right to demand a secret ballot election.  Id. § 101.19.  In 2009, elections were con-
ducted in a median of thirty-seven days after the filing of a petition.  NLRB, 
PERFORMANCE AND ACCOUNTABILITY REPORT 24 (2009), available at 
http://www.nlrb.gov/nlrb/shared_files/reports/PAR/2009/PAR2009.pdf.  During 
this time, employers frequently engage in aggressive anti-union campaigning and of-
ten utilize coercive and illegal measures to diminish the chances of a union victory 
on election day.  See KATE BRONFENBRENER, NO HOLDS BARRED: THE INTENSIFICATION 
OF EMPLOYER OPPOSITION TO ORGANIZING 2–3 (2009), available at 
http://www.americanrightsatwork.org/dmdocuments/ARAWReports/noholdsbarre
d.pdf.  The EFCA prevents employers from utilizing pre-election coercive tactics by 
eliminating an employer’s right to demand an election once a majority of employees 
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the Act is increasing the likelihood of employers’ intentional non-
compliance with the NLRA. 
233
  In 1983, 20.1 percent of America’s 
workforce belonged to a labor union.
234
  This figure, steadily declin-
ing, fell to 13.4 percent in 2000 and to 12.4 percent in 2008.
235
  Al-
though section 7 provides nonunion employees with the same rights 
as unionized workers, most nonunion workers are either ignorant of 
the NLRA’s existence or believe that the Act does not apply to 
them.
236
  Labor unions are more aware of their workers’ rights under 
the law and consequently more likely to contest unlawful PSC rules.  
The continuing decline of unionization in America will likely streng-
then employers’ incentive to ignore the NLRA’s prohibition on PSC 
rules because nonunion opposition to such policies is doubtful. 
The second deficiency in the NLRA’s ability to protect em-
ployees against PSC rules involves the limited scope of section 7.  The 
NLRA’s extension of section 7 rights does not reach those employees 
who qualify as supervisors under the Act’s definition and thus leaves a 
large class of employees unprotected from PSC rules.  Section 7, the 
source of wage-discussion protection, only affords “employees” the 
right to engage in concerted activity.
237
  The NLRA states that “the 
term ‘employee’ . . . shall not include . . . any individual employed as 
a supervisor.”
238
  Case law has consistently affirmed that supervisory 
employees have no section 7 rights.
239
  This gap in the NLRA’s protec-
 
manifest a desire to be represented by a union. See H.R. 1409, S. 560, 111th Cong. 
(2009).  Under section 2 of the EFCA, if a majority of employees in an appropriate 
bargaining unit sign valid authorization cards, the Board shall certify a labor union 
without a secret ballot election.  Id. 
 233 See Gely & Bierman, supra note 103, at 148–49. 
 234 News Release, Bureau of Labor Statistics, U.S. Dept. of Labor, Union Members 
in 2008, at 1 (Jan. 28, 2009), available at http://www.bls.gov/news.release/pdf/ 
union2.pdf. 
 235 Id.; Bureau of Labor Statistics, U.S. Dept. of Labor, Labor Force Statistics from 
the Current Population Survey, http://www.bls.gov/cps/cpslutabs.htm (last visited 
May 21, 2010). 
 236 William Corbett, Waiting for the Labor Law of the Twenty-First Century, 23 BERKELEY 
J. EMP. & LAB. L. 259, 267 (2002) (“The scope of coverage of section 7 and its applica-
tion to nonunion employees may have been one of the best-kept secrets of labor 
law.”). 
 237 29 U.S.C. § 157 (2006). 
 238 Id. § 152(3). 
 239 See, e.g., Hanna Mining Co. v. Dist. 2, Marine Eng’rs Beneficial Ass’n, 382 U.S. 
181, 188 (1965) (“[Section] 7 no longer bestows upon supervisory employees the 
rights to engage in self-organization, collective bargaining, and other concerted ac-
tivities.”); NLRB v. Silver Bay Local 962, 498 F.2d 26, 28 (9th Cir. 1974) (“It has long 
been recognized that supervisors are not entitled to the protection afforded ‘ordi-
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tion of workers is amplified by a very inclusive definition of the term 
“supervisor.”
240
  The NLRA defines many types of employees as super-
visors that convention would probably regard as regular employees.
241
  
Additionally, the Board, representing the employee’s interest rather 
than the employer’s interest, has the burden of proving the em-
ployees are not supervisors.
242
  This makes it even more difficult for 
employees who have even limited amounts of responsibility to gain 
section 7 protection of wage discussion. 
Ledbetter illustrates the potentially negative effects of the NLRA’s 
exclusion of supervisors.  Lilly Ledbetter was a supervisor at Goo-
dyear.
243
  The dissent suggested that she did not discover that Goo-
dyear was subjecting her to pay discrimination in part because of 
Goodyear’s policy of confidentiality regarding pay.
244
  If Ledbetter 
suspected that she was a victim of pay discrimination within the 180-
day filing period, Goodyear could have legally obstructed her from 
investigating her suspicions by maintaining a PSC rule.  The same 
Goodyear officials who discriminated against Ledbetter could threat-
en her with termination if she asked coworkers about their pay, and 
the NLRA would provide her no recourse.  The inequitable character 
of the situation is clear: supervisors, such as Lilly Ledbetter, are also 
vulnerable to pay discrimination and should be entitled to discuss 
their wage with coworkers. 
 
nary employees’ under the Act, and that ‘as to supervisors there can be no such thing 
as a discriminatory discharge or an unfair labor practice.’”) (quoting NLRB v. Fuller-
ton Publishing Co., 283 F.2d 545, 551 (9th Cir. 1960)); Mon River Towing, Inc. v. 
NLRB, 421 F.2d 1, 6 (3d Cir. 1969) (stating that section-7 “protection does not ex-
tend to supervisors”). 
 240 § 152(11) (“[A]ny individual having authority, in the interest of the employer, 
to hire, transfer, suspend, lay off, recall, promote, discharge, assign, reward, or dis-
cipline other employees, or responsibility to direct them, or to adjust their griev-
ances, or effectively to recommend such action, if in connection with the foregoing 
the exercise of such authority is not of a merely routine or clerical nature, but re-
quires the use of independent judgment.”). 
 241 See, e.g., NLRB v. Wheeling Elec. Co., 444 F.2d 783 (4th Cir. 1971) (classifying a 
secretary with access to confidential information as a supervisor); Eastern Greyhound 
Lines v. NLRB, 337 F.2d 84 (6th Cir. 1964) (classifying bus-line dispatchers as super-
visors); Cleveland Cliffs Iron Co., 117 N.L.R.B. 668 (1957) (finding that a handyman 
on a freight vessel qualified as a supervisor). 
 242 E.g., Integrated Health Servs. v. NLRB, 191 F.3d 703, 705 (6th Cir. 1999). 
 243 Ledbetter v. Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co., 421 F.3d 1169, 1173 (11th Cir. 
2005), aff’d, 550 U.S. 618 (2007), superseded by statute, Lilly Ledbetter Fair Pay Act of 
2009, Pub. L. No. 111-2, 123 Stat. 5. 
 244 See supra note 79 and accompanying text. 
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B. The NLRA Should Preempt Existing State Statutes 
Under the current interpretation of the NLRA, state statutes 
prohibiting PSC rules are not a viable alternative to NLRB enforce-
ment.  The NLRA probably preempts state legislation prohibiting 
PSC rules to the extent that the statutes protect non-supervisory em-
ployees. 
Analysis regarding NLRA preemption of state or federal legisla-
tion begins with the Supreme Court’s decision in San Diego Building 
Trades Council v. Garmon.
245
  In Garmon, Justice Frankfurter significant-
ly limited the states’ ability to legislate on matters of labor relations 
and provided the foundation for the NLRA preemption analysis: 
“When an activity is arguably subject to § 7 or § 8 of the [NLRA], the 
States as well as the federal court, must defer to the exclusive compe-
tence of the National Labor Relations Board if the danger of state in-
terference with national policy is to be averted.”
246
  The Supreme 
Court determined that state jurisdiction yields to the NLRA when the 
state attempts to regulate activities arguably protected by section 7 or 
outlawed by section 8.
247
 
Although Garmon remains the basic standard for NLRA preemp-
tion of state legislation, subsequent decisions have adjusted the stan-
dard and provided certain exceptions.  In 1978, the Supreme Court 
tweaked the Garmon standard and held that when alleged conduct 
may be “arguably prohibited” by the Garmon preemption test, the crit-
ical issue is “whether the controversy presented to the state court is 
identical . . . or different from . . . that which could have been, but 
was not, presented to the Labor Board.”
248
 
In addition to this adjustment of the Garmon standard, three 
primary exceptions apply to the preemption doctrine.
249
  The first two 
exceptions are contained in the Garmon opinion itself and have been 
adopted and expanded by subsequent courts.  First, the NLRA does 
not preempt state regulation of activity that is merely a peripheral 
 
 245 359 U.S. 236 (1959); see Teamsters Local 372 v. Detroit Newspapers, 956 F. 
Supp. 753, 759 (E.D. Mich. 1997) (“Any analysis regarding NLRA preemption of 
RICO must necessarily begin with the Supreme Court decision in San Diego Bldg. 
Trades Council  v. Garmon.”). 
 246 Garmon, 359 U.S. at 245. 
 247 Id. at 244. 
 248 Sears, Roebuck & Co. v. San Diego County Dist. Council of Carpenters, 436 
U.S. 180, 197 (1978). 
 249 See Farmer v. United Bhd. of Carpenters, 430 U.S. 290, 296–97 (1977). 
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concern of the NLRA.
250
  Second, the NLRA will not preempt state 
regulation of an activity that touches interests “deeply rooted in local 
feeling and responsibility.”
251
  In addition to the two judicially created 
exceptions to the Garmon doctrine, the Court recognizes congres-
sional exclusions of certain classes of cases from the Board’s exclusive 
jurisdiction.
252
 
Nevertheless, to the extent that the existing state statutes prohi-
biting PSC rules apply to non-supervisory employees, the NLRA 
should preempt them.  Under the standard for preemption articu-
lated in Garmon, state legislation may not regulate activity surround-
ing PSC rules if the NLRB has already recognized a right under sec-
tion 7 or an unfair labor practice under section 8 involving wage 
disclosure.
253
  The NLRB and reviewing courts have repeatedly recog-
nized a right under section 7 to disclose one’s wage and have recog-
nized that prohibiting wage disclosure through maintenance of PSC 
rules constitutes an unfair labor practice.
254
  When judged under the 
preemption standard articulated in Sears, state statutes are even more 
clearly preempted.
255
  Bringing a claim under state statutes for inter-
ference with one’s right to disclose one’s wage is identical to a claim 
that can be brought to the NLRB. 
Finally, the state statutes do not fall within any of the three ex-
ceptions to the Garmon doctrine because wage discussion is not peri-
pheral to the NLRA,
256
 wage discussion does not touch and concern a 
 
 250 Id. at 296; see, e.g., Linn v. United Plant Guard Workers, 383 U.S. 53 (1966) 
(holding that the NLRA does not preempt a civil action in state court for libel when 
a union makes false, defamatory remarks during a union-organizing campaign). 
 251 Garmon, 359 U.S. at 244. 
 252 Farmer, 430 U.S. at 297 n.8; see, e.g., 29 U.S.C. § 187(b) (2006) (allowing parties 
to bring suit in federal district court to recover damages from violations of section 
8(b)(4) of the NLRA even though the unfair labor practice is remediable by the 
Board).  Section 14(c)(2) of the NLRA also permits the Board to decline jurisdiction 
over “any labor dispute involving any class or category of employers, where, in the 
opinion of the Board, the effect of such labor dispute on commerce is not sufficient-
ly substantial to warrant the exercise of its jurisdiction,” and thus, the Board may 
leave jurisdiction in the hands of state or federal courts.  Id. § 164(c)(1). 
 253 Garmon, 359 U.S. at 244. 
 254 See supra Part IV.A. 
 255 See Sears, Roebuck & Co. v. San Diego County Dist. Council of Carpenters, 436 
U.S. 180, 197 (1978). 
 256 See Jeannette Corp. v. NLRB, 532 F.2d 916, 919 (3d Cir. 1976) 
(“[D]issatisfaction due to low wages is the grist on which concerted activity feeds.”). 
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particular locality,
257
 and Congress has yet to carve out the NLRB’s ju-
risdiction over PSC rules.  As applied to PSC rules, the NLRA 
preemption doctrine leads to the conclusion that the NLRA 
preempts any state statutes regarding PSC rules to the extent that 
they protect non-supervisory employees. 
In 2002, the California Court of Appeals suggested that the 
NLRA may preempt section 225 of the California Labor Code but left 
the issue to the trial court on remand.
258
  Six years later, the Califor-
nia Court of Appeals revisited the issue of preemption in the context 
of section 232.5, a provision of California Labor Code that extends 
section 225 protections regarding wage disclosure to working-
condition disclosure.  In Luke v. Collotype Labels USA, Inc.,
259
 the plain-
tiff brought a public-policy claim based on section 225.5.
260
  The court 
found that the NLRA preempted the statute and thus rendered use-
less any future attempt by non-supervisory employees to find protec-
tion under the statute.
261
  Because section 232.5 is almost identical to 
section 232, future courts will likely conclude that the NLRA 
preempts the state’s statute prohibiting PSC rules. 
Although state statutes will likely prove largely ineffective be-
cause of preemption, the statutes will continue to protect the supervi-
sors’ right to disclose their wages because the NLRA does not 
preempt this protection.  None of the four state statutes has a defini-
tion of “employee” that explicitly excludes supervisors.  Rather, the 
definitions appear to include anybody hired by the employer.
262
  The 
 
 257 The notion that wage discussion does not touch and concern a particular local-
ity is evidenced by the fact that the state statutes exist in four very different states: 
Michigan, California, Vermont, and Colorado.  See infra note 262 and accompanying 
text.  
 258 Grant-Burton v. Covenant Care, Inc., 122 Cal. Rptr. 2d 204, 218 n.2 (Cal. Ct. 
App. 2002). 
 259 72 Cal. Rptr. 3d 440 (Cal. Ct. App. 2008).  
 260 Id. at 442. 
 261 Id. at 445, 448. 
 262 See COLO. REV. STAT. § 24-34-401(2) (LEXIS through 2009 legislation) (“‘Em-
ployee’ means any person employed by an employer, except a person in the domestic 
service of any person.”); MICH. COMP. LAWS SERV. § 408.471(1)(c) (LexisNexis, LEXIS 
through 2008 legislation) (“‘Employee’ means any individual employed by an em-
ployer.”); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 21, § 495d(2) (LEXIS through 2009 Sess.) (“‘Employee’ 
means every person who may be permitted, required or directed by any employer, in 
consideration of direct or indirect gain or profit, to perform services.”).  The Cali-
fornia Labor Code does not define “employee” within the article that protects wage 
disclosure.  But see CAL. LAB. CODE § 350(b) (West 2003) (“‘Employee’ means every 
person, including aliens and minors, rendering actual service in any business for an 
employer, whether gratuitously or for wages or pay, whether the wages or pay are 
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state statutes’ protection of supervisors does not overlap with any pro-
tection offered by section 7 of the NLRA.  The NLRA explicitly ex-
cludes supervisors from the rights afforded to employees by section 7.  
In fact, section 7 arguably does not protect the activity in question—
supervisor wage disclosure.  Therefore, the NLRA does not preempt 
state legislation that regulates the matter. 
VI. POTENTIAL SOLUTIONS 
Any meaningful reform of legislation concerning PSC rules must 
accomplish three goals to be effective.  First, reform must provide in-
centives for employers to abandon PSC rules and deterrents for em-
ployers who are considering adopting PSC rules.  Second, legislative 
reform must extend the right to engage in wage discussion to super-
visory employees.  Finally, new laws should mandate that employers 
provide employees notice of their right to engage in wage discussion.  
Three proposed solutions could be used to attempt to satisfy these 
three goals. 
In the first proposed solution, congressional or judicial reform 
gives the NLRA bite and creates a notice requirement, and state sta-
tutes operate only to the extent that they do not preempt the 
NLRA—providing rights to supervisory employees.  Enabling the 
NLRB to impose civil penalties or punitive damages against employ-
ers who maintain PSC rules will help prevent employers from adopt-
ing the rules at all.  Unlike the existing situation under the NLRA, 
employers will have incentives to abandon PSC rules.
263
  In addition, 
the NLRA will only preempt state legislation providing coverage to all 
employees in cases involving non-supervisory employees.  Supervisors 
will have an avenue of relief outside of the NLRB. 
Several problems make this first option impractical.  First, 
reform of the NLRA is unlikely.  Prior to the Employee Free Choice 
Act (EFCA),
264
 the 95th Congress made the last attempt to strengthen 
 
measured by the standard of time, piece, task, commission, or other method of calcu-
lation, and whether the service is rendered on a commission, concessionaire, or oth-
er basis.”); Grant-Burton v. Covenant Care, Inc., 122 Cal. Rptr. 2d 204, 216 n.1 (Cal. 
Ct. App. 2002) (“Labor Code Section 923 does protect the concerted activities of su-
pervisors.”). 
 263 The incentive is that the cost of civil penalties and punitive damages outweighs 
the utility of maintaining PSC rules.  Accordingly, legislation should provide a ge-
nerous punitive-damages cap and civil penalties that exact meaningful financial 
harm on violators. 
 264 See supra note 232 and accompanying text.  Although Democrats control Con-
gress and the White House, the card-check system proposed under the EFCA would 
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the NLRA, and it was successfully filibustered despite Democratic ma-
jorities in both houses and a pro-union president, Jimmy Carter.
265
  
Second, in light of the historically remedial nature of the NLRA,
266
 
Congress or the NLRB will very likely be unwilling to depart from 
such long precedent.  Third, much like the current situation, this op-
tion results in a fragmented regulatory framework.  While the NLRA 
would always cover non-supervisory employees, supervisors would on-
ly find protection in states that outlaw PSC rules.  State reform has 
generated only four statutes banning PSC rules in twenty-seven years.  
Progress is slow and certainly not guaranteed, especially in conserva-
tive states.  Finally, employers that operate in multiple states are likely 
to include choice-of-law clauses in their supervisors’ contracts to at-
tempt to avoid state laws that extend wage disclosure rights to super-
visors by litigating under state laws that are silent on PSC rules. 
The second option for reform modifies only the NLRA.  In this 
scenario, Congress gives the NLRA bite and extends the specific sec-
tion 7 right to discuss wages to supervisors.  Giving the NLRA power 
to levy punitive damages will discourage employers from adopting 
PSC rules.  Extending the right of wage disclosure to supervisors 
through the NLRA accomplishes the goal of blanket coverage of all 
employees expeditiously.  This presents a clear advantage over the 
first option, which would wait for state action.  The legal justification 
for imparting the section 7 right of wage disclosure onto supervisors 
stems from the original purpose of excluding supervisors in the first 
place.  The exclusion was motivated by Congress’s desire to free em-
ployers to fire foremen as a means of ensuring their loyalty and to 
prevent supervisor influence within a union.
267
  The reasons for ex-
cluding supervisors from the NLRA lack applicability in the context 
of PSC rules.  Nonetheless, this second option for reform fails be-
cause of the same deficiencies inherent in the first proposal.  Namely, 
 
“be a very tough sell with any Congress.”  William B. Gould IV, The Employee Free Choice 
Act of 2009, Labor Law Reform, and What Can Be Done About the Broken System of Labor-
Management Relations Law in the United States, 43 U.S.F. L. REV. 291, 310 (2008).  Con-
cerns of fraud, misrepresentation, and coercion frequently lead to disputes regarding 
the legitimacy of authorization cards.  Id. at 309–10.  Additionally, the proposed sys-
tem will allow for unions to more easily organize workplaces, which is sure to inspire 
automatic opposition from anti-union members of Congress.  Id. at 310−11.  Hostility 
toward unions among segments of Congress coupled with concerns surrounding po-
tential for peer pressure signal that the EFCA’s passage is far from certain.  Id. 
 265 Gely & Bierman, supra note 103, at 149. 
 266 See supra note 227 and accompanying text. 
 267 NLRB v. Yeshiva Univ., 444 U.S. 672, 694–95 (1980). 
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similar NLRA reform has failed in the past, and Congress is unlikely 
to alter the NLRA’s fundamental remedial nature. 
The final and most promising option for reform calls for con-
gressional legislation to accomplish the following: make PSC rules il-
legal per se, provide civil penalties for violations, allow plaintiffs to 
recover punitive damages, establish notice requirements in all 
workplaces, and extend protection to supervisors and non-supervisory 
employees alike.  Congress can utilize the third exception to the 
Garmon preemption doctrine to carve out jurisdiction of wage disclo-
sure activity to state and federal courts.
268
  Unlike the NLRB, the 
NLRA’s reparative philosophy will not restrict state and federal 
courts’ power to craft effective remedies.  Additionally, vesting the 
right to sue in attorneys general and employees will avoid problems 
that result from the NLRB’s reactive character.
269
  If Congress imple-
ments this option, all goals of reform are achieved.  The legislation 
will motivate employers to abandon PSC rules, extend the right to 
engage in wage discussion to supervisory employees, and provide no-
tice to employees.  This option is particularly appealing because 
reform is accomplished uniformly on a national basis rather than 
piecemeal by states.  Federal legislation should also include provi-
sions reassuring employers that the new law will not affect confiden-
tiality policies governing employees who handle salary information. 
In July 2006, Vermont Senator James Jeffords introduced the 
Wage Awareness Protection Act.
270
  This bill attempted to make PSC 
rules illegal per se.
271
  It failed to pass the Senate, which suggests that a 
similar bill may suffer the same fate; however, Ledbetter and the result-
ing attention directed toward wage discrimination should raise 
awareness of PSC rules’ potential danger and inspire legislators to re-
consider the importance of protecting the right to discuss pay.  The 
following model represents a summary of legislation that could effec-
tively curtail the ongoing promulgation of PSC rules: 
 
 268 See Sears, Roebuck & Co. v. San Diego County Dist. Council of Carpenters, 436 
U.S. 180, 197 (1978).  Although the NLRB may unilaterally relinquish its jurisdiction 
over certain subjects to state and federal courts pursuant to 29 U.S.C. § 164(c), this is 
not a suitable opportunity for such action because § 164(c)(1) requires that the ef-
fect of the labor activity be insubstantial.  See 29 U.S.C. § 164(c) (2006).  This is not 
the case with wage discussion because “dissatisfaction due to low wages is the grist on 
which concerted activity feeds.”  Jeannette Corp. v. NLRB, 532 F.2d 916, 919 (3d Cir. 
1976). 
 269 See supra notes 167−169 and accompanying text. 
 270 S. 2966, 106th Cong. (2000). 
 271 Id. § 2(a)(4)(B). 
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(A) Prohibited Acts.  No employer may do any of the following: 
 (i) Promulgate or enforce a written or oral employment policy 
 that forbids its employees from inquiring about, discussing, or 
 disclosing their own wages or the wages of other employees; or 
 (ii) Formally discipline, discharge, or discriminate against em
 ployees for inquiring about, discussing, or disclosing their own 
 wages or the wages of other employees. 
(B) Penalties and Enforcement. 
 (i) Whenever the attorney general has cause to believe that an 
 employer is engaged in a practice declared by this statute to be 
 unlawful, the attorney general may bring a civil action in the ap
 propriate district court of the United States.  District courts are 
 authorized to do any of the following: 
      (1) issue injunctions to restrain and prevent violations of 
 this statute; or 
      (2) impose civil penalties of not more than $10,000 for each 
 violation. 
 (ii) Any employee aggrieved by a violation of this statute may 
 bring an action in a district court of the United States seeking 
 compensatory and punitive damages or equitable relief, include
 ing restitution of wages or benefits, restraint of prohibited acts, 
 reinstatement, reasonable attorney’s fees, costs, and other ap
 propriate relief. 
(C) Posting of Notices; Penalties. 
 (i) Every employer shall keep posted in conspicuous locations 
 on its premises a notice setting forth a summary of this statute 
 and information pertinent to filing a complaint. 
 (ii) A violation of this subsection is punishable by a fine of no 
 more than $1,000 for each separate offense.
272
 
VII. CONCLUSION 
Ledbetter used an overly rigid interpretation of Title VII to estab-
lish a dangerous precedent that would have prohibited many em-
ployees from advancing legitimate claims of pay discrimination.  The 
LLFPA marked an important step in the fight against pay discrimina-
tion by overturning the central holding of Ledbetter, but it failed to ac-
 
 272 State statutes, federal statutes, and unenacted federal legislation informed the 
drafting of the model statute.  See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-10 (2006); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 9, § 
2458 (LEXIS through 2009 Sess.); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 21, § 495 (LEXIS through 2009 
Sess.); S. 2966. 
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cord adequate protection to employees in workplaces that promul-
gate PSC rules.  Such employees remain vulnerable to Title VII’s rela-
tively short statutory charging period and its two-year limit on back 
pay.  Rather than passing an amendment to Title VII, which could 
frustrate public policy favoring prompt processing of discrimination 
claims, future legislation should aim to solve the problem at its 
source⎯unlawful PSC rules. 
Lawmakers and judges on both the federal and state levels have 
recognized the importance of pay openness, but current legislation 
designed to prevent PSC rules is inherently flawed and ineffective.  
Congress must pass reform that carves out from the NLRB jurisdic-
tion over wage discussion and prevents the promulgation of PSC rules 
by instituting meaningful incentives for employers to comply with the 
law.  Until this happens, the LLFPA cannot operate to its full poten-
tial, and Title VII will continue to provide many American workers 
with inadequate protection against pay discrimination. 
 
